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How do national-level institutions relate to national comparative advantages?
We seek to shed light on this question by exploring two different sets of
hypotheses based on the Varieties of Capitalism and other branches of
comparative capitalisms literature. Applying fuzzy-set qualitative comparative
analysis to data from 14 industries in 22 countries across 9 years, we find that
comparative advantages in industries with radical innovation emerge in specific
configurations mixing coordinated and liberal institutional features.
Institutional comparative advantage in industries with radical innovation may
thus be based on the ‘‘beneficial constraints’’ of opposing institutional logics
rather than on the self-reinforcing institutional coherence envisioned in much
of the Varieties of Capitalism literature. By contrast, we find that coordinated
market economies may have comparative advantages in industries with
incremental innovation, as envisioned in the Varieties of Capitalism literature.
Our article contributes to our understanding of the ‘‘so what?’’ related to
capitalist diversity and its implications for location decisions of multinational
enterprises. We further present a coordination index going beyond Hall and
Gingerich (Br J Polit Sci 39:449–482, 2009) with annual values for 22 OECD
countries from 1995 through 2003.
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INTRODUCTION
What explains national comparative advantages? Almost 200 years
after the publication of David Ricardo’s On the Principles of Political
Economy and Taxation in 1817, the question has not conclusively
been answered. Traditional economics explanations, including
Ricardo’s and the later Heckscher–Ohlin model of trade, have
emphasized the importance of inherited natural endowments with
production factors such as labor and land. Empirical performance
of these models, however, is weak (Trefler & Zhu, 2000).
More recent alternative explanations are based on the diverse
institutional characteristics of national economies.1 Comparative
studies have argued that different types of institutions constrain
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and enable different forms of economic activity
(Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Most prominent among
these has been the Varieties of Capitalism frame-
work (Hall & Soskice, 2001), which contrasted
‘‘liberal market economies’’ and ‘‘coordinated mar-
ket economies.’’ Meanwhile, other theories of
comparative capitalism categorize countries in dif-
ferent ways based on diverse governance modes
(Crouch, 2005; Crouch & Streeck, 1997) or the
concepts of National Business Systems (Whitley,
1999). The common objective of this comparative
capitalisms literature has been to shed light on how
the institutional diversity of advanced capitalist
economies shapes economic and business
outcomes.
A core argument of the literature is that institu-
tions may generate distinct profiles of institutional
comparative advantage in production, which mani-
fest themselves in nationally distinct patterns of
economic performance and specialization across
different industrial sectors. For example, Schneider,
Schulze-Bentrop, & Paunescu (2010) explained rel-
ative export performance in high-tech and med-
ium-tech industries based on different institutional
characteristics of countries. Rather than a single
‘‘best’’ set of institutional arrangements, different
types of institutions give rise to distinct forms of
comparative advantage. Strong evidence in support
of institutional comparative advantage would have
important implications for government policy as
well as the location choices of multinational
enterprises (MNEs) seeking to avoid home country
disadvantages, project competitive advantages
related to their home country, or exploit comple-
mentary resources and knowledge related to host
country institutional environments (cf. Jackson &
Deeg, 2008; Singh, 2007; Witt & Lewin, 2007).
In this article we explore the question of institu-
tional comparative advantage in relation to two
arguments stemming from different branches of
the comparative capitalisms literature. First, we test
the well-known but widely contested hypothesis by
Hall and Soskice (2001) that liberal market econo-
mies (LMEs) have an institutional comparative
advantage in industries featuring radical innova-
tion, whereas coordinated market economies
(CMEs) have an institutional comparative advan-
tage in industries with incremental innovation.
This argument posits strong complementarities
among relatively coherent sets of institutions that
follow similar logics across all institutional
domains of the economy. Second, we develop an
alternative view that is based on conflictual logics
of action, rather than coherence. We hypothesize
that certain combinations of liberal market and
coordinated logics across two or more institutional
domains may enable institutional comparative
advantage by compensating for institutional weak-
nesses inherent in ‘‘pure’’ configurations. For exam-
ple, liberal corporate governance may provide an
important external monitoring of strongly coordi-
nated and otherwise insider-oriented governance
institutions (Aoki, 2010). This view posits the
potential for ‘‘beneficial constraints’’ based on
institutional arrangements with conflicting logics.
The article explores these ideas empirically by
comparing the trade patterns of countries during
the period of 1995–2003. In particular, we use
fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA)
to test whether different configurations of institu-
tions are sufficient for high performance in differ-
ent sectors, characterized by either radical or
incremental forms of innovation. We find that
pure CMEs have comparative advantages in indus-
tries with incremental innovation. However, we do
not find that LMEs have comparative advantages in
industries with radical innovation. Rather, the
results suggest that institutional comparative
advantage involves very specific combinations of
both liberal and coordinated types of institutions,
which is in line with our own hypotheses.
We conclude with a discussion of implications
and limitations of this study. In particular, our
findings suggest the need to distinguish conceptu-
ally between complementarity and coherence of
institutions and pay greater attention to how
tensions resulting from opposing institutional log-
ics can result in beneficial outcomes. By exploring
the linkage between institutional configurations
and economic outcomes, our article contributes to
our understanding of the ‘‘so what?’’ of variety in
capitalisms. Finally, our analysis shows that a
number of countries have, over time, diverged
from the commonly held notions about their
institutional make-up. Germany, for instance, has
evolved away from the pure-type coordinated mar-
ket economy that it is commonly believed to
represent.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
Comparative Capitalisms
Renewed interest in institutions has led to a large
and complex literature on comparative capitalisms
focused on institutional diversity across national
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contexts (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Considerable
agreement exists that national diversity exists
across several core institutional domains such as
education and skills formation, employment rela-
tions, financial system, interfirm networks, internal
dynamics of the firm, ownership and corporate
governance, and the institutions of the state itself
(Witt & Redding, 2013). Many studies explore how
such differences cluster into distinct types of insti-
tutional configurations. Several competing typolo-
gies exist. For instance, Hall and Soskice (2001)
distinguished CMEs and LMEs as two distinct forms
of capitalism. Amable (2003) identified five types:
market-based, Asian, Continental European, social-
democratic, and Mediterranean. Whitley (1999)
describes six major types of business systems:
fragmented, coordinated industrial district, com-
partmentalized, state-organized, collaborative, and
highly coordinated. Looking beyond the advanced
industrialized countries, further types have been
proposed (cf. Witt, Kabbach de Castro, Amaeshi,
Mahroum, Bohle, & Saez, 2015).
The challenge of creating theoretically rich and
valid typologies is complicated by institutional
change. While most comparative capitalism schol-
ars reject the possibility of institutional conver-
gence (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley 1999;
Yamamura & Streeck, 2003), many types of capi-
talism have undergone substantial liberalization.
Thus a growing literature now focuses on the
mechanisms of institutional change (Mahoney &
Thelen, 2009; Streeck & Thelen, 2005) and the
diverging trajectories in different types of capital-
ism (Hall & Thelen, 2009; Streeck, 2008; Witt &
Lewin, 2007).
Meanwhile, research linking institutional differ-
ences to specific economic outcomes has remained
surprisingly underdeveloped. First, a lack of con-
sensus continues about relevant typologies. Conse-
quently, scholars have continued to put energy
into criticizing specific typologies (Allen, 2004;
Blyth, 2003), validating typologies with empirical
data (Brewster, Wood, & Brookes, 2006) or extend-
ing these to new geographic contexts (Bohle &
Greskovits, 2009; Carney, Gedajlovic, & Yang,
2009). Second, suitable measures of institutional
diversity have limited availability. For instance,
Varieties of Capitalism scholars have only produced
an index of institutional diversity for 22 OECD
countries for a single time point, the mid-1990s
(Hall & Gingerich, 2009). No time series is avail-
able, nor does the index cover countries outside the
OECD. For the business systems approach (Whitley,
1999), no index is available. Some efforts have
sought to overcome these shortcomings by drawing
directly on the underlying institutional dimensions
(e.g., Judge, Fainshmidt, & Brown III, 2014; Sch-
neider & Paunescu, 2012). However, obtaining
institutional measures with construct validity has
proved difficult, especially for countries outside the
OECD (Witt & Redding, 2013). Together, these
obstacles have limited the wider application of
comparative institutional analysis in International
Business. A substantial research agenda remains to
understand how institutions shape the comparative
institutional advantage of different countries in the
world economy.
As a step to overcoming this challenge, this paper
examines the key arguments from the Varieties of
Capitalism framework that link institutions to
comparative institutional advantage. Despite much
criticism (Allen, 2004; Blyth, 2003) and alternative
theoretical frameworks for comparing institutions
(Amable, 2003; Crouch & Streeck, 1997; Whitley,
1999), the Varieties of Capitalism framework con-
tinues to have a uniquely powerful hold on the
field. Critics have made various important claims
about the categorization of countries and how this
changes over time: the parsimony of Varieties of
Capitalism may overlook substantial institutional
variety within the LME and CME categories (Yama-
mura & Streeck, 2003), emerging and transition
economies cannot be understood using this
approach (No¨lke & Vliegenthart, 2009; Redding &
Witt, 2007), and its emphasis on complementari-
ties and path dependence systematically overstates
institutional stability and underestimates institu-
tional change (Crouch, 2005). These criticisms
notwithstanding, recent evidence supports the
notion that advanced industrialized nations do
indeed cluster very broadly into LMEs and CMEs
(Witt & Redding, 2013). More importantly, how-
ever, most critiques of Varieties of Capitalism do
not center on its core claims about institutional
comparative advantage.
Next, we turn to the main hypothesis of the
Varieties of Capitalism approach and review empir-
ical literature that tests these claims. After this, we
will explore and develop an alternative hypothesis
drawing on some alternative strands of the com-
parative capitalism literature.
The Varieties of Capitalism Hypothesis:
Comparative Advantage Through Coherence
In developing the Varieties of Capitalism approach,
Hall and Soskice (2001) proposed that the advanced
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industrialized societies fall into two main types:
LMEs and CMEs. Firms in LMEs tend to rely more
on liberal market mechanisms, while firms in CMEs
tend to coordinate business transactions through
non-market relationships. The prototypical LME,
such as the US, features a market-driven financial
system, flexible use of external labor markets,
generalist education and training systems, low
levels of networks and alliances among firms, and
management-driven, top-down decision-making
structures inside firms. The classic CME, such as
Germany around 1995, has a bank-led financial
system providing patient capital, stronger internal
labor markets based on employment protection,
skills formation systems conducive to the develop-
ment of specialized skills, high levels of networks
and alliances among firms, and consensual deci-
sion-making inside firms bringing together man-
agement and labor. These institutional differences
encourage firms to invest in and utilize transferable
assets to a greater extent in LMEs, where institu-
tions do not bind economic actors to long-term
commitments but support their ‘‘keeping options
open’’ to using the external market. By contrast, the
use of relational assets in CMEs implies investments
whose value is specific to the continuation of long-
term relationships among company stakeholders.
Such investments require different sorts of institu-
tional support – such as protection of investments
in firm-specific human capital and contracting
arrangements, or mechanisms to govern collective
action problems (e.g., free rider problems) and
support wider patterns of cooperation across a
network or industry.
The Varieties of Capitalism framework posits that
LMEs and CMEs exhibit strong complementarities
by being organized around a coherent institutional
logic (Deeg, 2007). Complementarities exist where
features of institutional structures reinforce each
other by mutually generating increasing returns.
Meanwhile, coherence is present where institutions
follow the same market or coordinated logic across
domains of the economy, such as corporate gover-
nance and employment relations. Since coherent
institutions are hypothesized to uniformly support
either transferrable or relational assets, the Varieties
of Capitalism approach claims that institutions in
different domains will complement one another by
mutually reinforcing such investments. Based on
their capacity to enable these different kinds of
investments, Varieties of Capitalism argues that
complementary sets of institutions favor certain
patterns of economic activity over others that
manifest in comparative strengths and weaknesses
in different types of industries. By contrast, coun-
tries with lower levels of coherence – ‘‘mixed types’’
– are argued to lack the institutional complemen-
tarities needed for institutional comparative
advantage.
Based on this logic, Hall and Soskice (2001)
proposed that LMEs and CMEs would show distinct
patterns of institutional comparative advantage for
radical or incremental innovations. Hall and Sos-
kice (2001: 38f.) defined radical innovation as
‘‘entail[ing] substantial shifts in product lines, the
development of entirely new goods, or major
changes to the production process,’’ while incre-
mental innovation is ‘‘marked by continuous but
small-scale improvements to existing product lines
and production processes.’’ They argued that the
combination of patient capital, long-term employ-
ment, and firm-specific skills in CMEs would enable
more efficient production in industries with incre-
mental patterns of innovation because the relative
immobility of labor and capital in CMEs enabled
and constrained firms to focus their efforts on
improving existing lines of products. Meanwhile,
fluid capital markets with short-term employment
and general skills in LMEs would enable more
efficient production in industries with radical pat-
terns of innovation, as these conditions support
firms using external markets to mobilize risky
equity finance and workers with different skill sets,
and thereby take advantage of new technological
breakthroughs. Since comparative advantage is
defined as the ability to make one product more
efficiently than another, this suggests the presence
of comparative advantage in industries drawing on
incremental innovation in CMEs and radical inno-
vation in LMEs. By the Law of Comparative
Advantage (Dearsdorff, 1980), this advantage
should be visible in international trade patterns.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1 LMEs show trade patterns consistent with
institutional comparative advantage in industries
featuring radical innovation, whereas CMEs show
trade patterns consistent with institutional com-
parative advantages in industries with incre-
mental innovation.
Prior Tests
Despite its centrality, some fifteen years after the
publication of Hall and Soskice’s piece, H1 remains
open territory. Attempts to test it have faced several
interrelated conceptual and methodological
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challenges. First, mapping institutional diversity
onto the two LME and CME categories is less
straightforward than commonly assumed (see more
generally Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Different studies
use different sets of indicators, or benchmark
countries against assumed ideal–typical countries
like Germany for CMEs (Allen & Aldred, 2009;
Schneider et al., 2010). Second, the concept of
radical and incremental innovation has proven
slippery. Operationalizing radicality requires a valid
way of classifying industries according to different
types of innovation. Most existing studies have
relied on categorizations supplied by the OECD to
describe high-tech or medium high-tech industries.
This classification is based on R&D intensity, which
is a measure of investment or inputs into the
innovation process rather the output of actual
innovation. Third, empirical work has focused
either on the influence of institutions on innova-
tion patterns or the influence of institutions on
export success, but missed what we see as the core
of the Varieties of Capitalism hypothesis – namely,
the idea that the influence of institutions on trade
outcomes is mediated by or contingent upon types
of innovation. Cross-country differences exist in
the patterns of radical or incremental innovation
(Furman, Porter, & Stern, 2002), and this capacity
does relate to institutional features of the economy,
such as employment relations (Bassanini & Ernst,
2002). However, we see this as a separate debate. In
our view, the core of the Varieties of Capitalism
hypothesis actually revolves around comparative
advantage in products as the dependent variable,
rather than R&D spending or patents. The Varieties
of Capitalism argument stresses the ability of firms
to draw on these innovations in the productive
process, not their ability to make radical innova-
tions. Firm-level studies using both approaches
have found these to be potentially complementary,
but in fact very distinct, phenomena (Herrmann &
Peine, 2011).
To our knowledge, only four major published
studies have attempted to explicitly test the Vari-
eties of Capitalism hypothesis. Taylor (2004) and
Akkermans, Castaldi, & Los (2009) examined inno-
vation patterns as visible in patent data. While
Taylor found no support of the hypothesis, Akker-
mans and colleagues claimed qualified support.
However, both papers tested only the ability of
economies to produce radically innovative patents
and not actual institutional comparative advan-
tage, which is the outcome of interest in this paper.
Schneider et al. (2010) as well as Schneider and
Paunescu (2012) used trade outcomes to claim
qualified support of the Hall and Soskice hypoth-
esis. Both papers relied on exports as a measure of
comparative advantage. However, as the case of
electronics in China illustrates (e.g., Redding &
Witt, 2009), high levels of exports in an industry
may occur on the back of high levels of imports of
high value added inputs in the same industry, in
which case only a small proportion of the value of
the exports in these industries are produced in the
respective country. These imports need taking into
account to establish whether a comparative advan-
tage exists. The two papers also relied on OECD
classifications of research intensity to express rad-
icality. However, radicality is an output of research
activity, while research intensity is an input mea-
sure based on R&D spending relative to industry
size. In sum, prior works have either sought to
explain innovation patterns rather than compara-
tive advantage, or suffered from issues with con-
struct validity of key variables. As will be explained
in the methodology section, this article will offer a




The Varieties of Capitalism approach has assumed
that complementarities require coherence of insti-
tutions (e.g., pure LME types, where all institutions
are liberal). The underlying logic stems from the
concept of complementarities as developed in
economics (Milgrom & Roberts, 1994, 1995),
whereby investments in transferable assets in one
institutional domain are complemented by trans-
ferable assets in other domains. For example,
portable skills are expected to increase in value for
workers if firms also have corporate governance
arrangements whereby capital investment is shifted
rapidly from one firm to another. Conversely, long-
term relational employment relationships are pre-
sumed to benefit from ‘‘patient capital’’ of coordi-
nated blockholders, whose long-term strategic
investment in the firm will protect the firm-specific
skill investments of workers.
Based on this reasoning, Varieties of Capitalism
implies a very restrictive view of how institutions
combine. Comparative advantage relates to the
coherence of incentives provided by the set of
institutions within a country, and thus comple-
mentarities only form when institutions cluster
into only two ideal–typical patterns. We believe
that these assumptions about complementarities
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are problematic and at odds with empirical work
linking comparative advantage to more complex or
hybrid combinations of coordinated and liberal
institutions (Boyer, 2004). We thus draw on a
stream of the comparative capitalisms literature
grounded in economic sociology to develop an
alternative set of hypotheses regarding comple-
mentarities based on opposing institutional logics.
Our intuition here is to see complementarities as
essentially grounded within political projects.
Crouch (2005) argued that institutions may have
positive effects by compensating for the weaknesses
of other institutions. For example, political systems
often utilize competing institutional logics that
serve as checks and balances on one another – such
as when the rule of law in the judiciary acts to
balance the logic of majority rule in the legislature.
Along these lines, sociological theories of compar-
ative capitalism have observed that opposing logics
or principles of social organizations may be useful
complements (Crouch, Streeck, Boyer, Amable,
Hall, & Jackson, 2005; Ho¨pner, 2005). Here the
political economy of capitalism involves not simply
a choice between coordination or liberal markets,
but reflects political coalitions and compromises
that seek a balance between them. The interests
and relative powers of different actors groups,
particularly corporate stakeholders, come into play.
Liberal markets produce winners and losers, also
generating counter-movements seeking to contain
the influence of markets through efforts of coordi-
nation and social protection (Block & Somers,
2014). In terms of the CME and LME typology, this
perspective implies that mixed cases or hybrids may
have beneficial characteristics. For example, Boyer
(2004) showed that Nordic economies achieved
economic growth in emerging ITC sectors based on
a specific combination of liberal markets and
coordinated institutions. However, whether or not
mixed cases work well together depends on the
extent to which the specific combination of market
and coordinated logics across two or more domains
may help compensate for one another. Unfortu-
nately, the comparative capitalism literature offers
only scant theorizing about specific hybrid
combinations.
Based on these considerations, we develop two
hypotheses whereby coordinated institutions help
to prevent or remedy market failures in liberal
settings or, following the inverse logic, liberal
market institutions help to remedy problems of
rigidity in highly coordinated settings. Here oppos-
ing institutional logics complement one another.
To elaborate this idea, we focus on the two most
salient stakeholders of the firm: shareholders and
employees. Here we see a potential counterbalanc-
ing role to be played by each of these groups.
Shareholders may benefit from liberal corporate
governance and establish this as a counterweight to
more coordinated institutions. Likewise, employ-
ees may favor more coordinated employment
relations and benefit from coordination as a coun-
terweight to otherwise liberal institutions. These
mixed configurations reflect a compromise or
balancing between opposing logics, whereby the
interests of one key stakeholder are addressed
within an overall context that is more hostile to
their interests.
In developing these hypotheses, we turn to the
concept of ‘‘beneficial constraints’’ in economic
sociology (Streeck, 1997). Streeck argues that
socially institutionalized constraints on the
rational voluntarism associated with markets may
be economically beneficial. Normative constraints
and social obligation are needed to correct market
failures, and thus also enable economic actors to
develop and protect collective goods or commit-
ments to stakeholders that would otherwise fall
victim to hyper-rational economizing. Rather than
allowing economic actors to pursue their given
preferences, institutions may transform the identi-
ties and interests of actors by constraining their
pursuit of short-term aims and leading them to
search for new and alternative strategies that are
legitimate in their institutional context. In doing
so, institutional constraints can turn institutions
into beneficial resources2 by simultaneously
enabling new forms of coordination and coopera-
tion, thus potentially attaining higher levels of
economic performance than might be possible in
their absence. By constraining certain market
behaviors, institutions may help create or protect
critical resources based on coordinated investments
by stakeholders. As Streeck argued: ‘‘Beneficial
constraint…is a dialectical concept, suggesting a
relationship of both mutually subversive and mutu-
ally supportive conflict between the economic
and the social, ruling out any lasting harmony
between the two’’ (Streeck, 1997: 207). Importantly,
this view of institutions goes beyond the notion
of property rights or embeddedness in social net-
works that facilitate market exchange. Rather,
institutions act as constraints on markets, on
the one hand, but serve to stabilize them, on the
other – thus suggesting their Durkheimian charac-
ter (Jackson & Muellenborn, 2012).
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Viewed from this perspective, the coherent set of
market-oriented institutions characterizing LMEs
may have inherently self-destructive tendencies. As
markets across different domains of the economy
reinforce one another by creating incentives for
greater market-orientation, these markets may
become overheated or hyper-rational. Time
horizons may become too short and market failures
may occur in relation to long-term financial invest-
ments, development of cooperative supplier
relationships, or fostering of firm-specific skills in
productive capabilities (Campbell, 2011; Jackson &
Petraki, 2010). Positively, firms in LMEs may
respond quickly to radical innovations by shifting
their investments in markets for capital and labor.
However, left unconstrained, firms may also be
likely to focus on predatory responses, such as
using mergers and acquisitions to obtain new
technologies or protect market shares or aggres-
sively restructure corporate hierarchies by shedding
employees and boosting shareholder returns. As a
result, firms may be unable to capitalize on radical
innovations by developing related firm-specific
advantages that lead to sustained comparative
advantages, as suggested by the resource-based
view and other theories (Newbert, 2007).
These deficits of purely liberal markets are likely
to be most acute in the area of employment
relations. Employee skills and organizational capa-
bilities based upon them are essential for compar-
ative advantage during times of discontinuous
change (Aoki & Jackson, 2008; Rajan & Zingales,
2000). In particular, firms entering and expanding
new lines of business as a result of radical innova-
tion will need skilled employees with sufficient
understanding of the workings of the firm (i.e.,
firm-specific skills) to capitalize on the opportuni-
ties offered by new technology. While active exter-
nal labor markets may help firms gain access to new
skills, left fully to the logic of the market, firms are
also likely to suffer from substantial problems to
retain key employees through periods of dynamic
change. Economic sociology has thus suggested
that markets need to be embedded within social
relations, not only for moral or political reasons,
but for economic ones. Institutional constraints
imposed by coordination may be beneficial for
markets precisely because they curtail the oppor-
tunism and hyper-rationality that lock actors into
potential market failures due to collective action
problems. Many countries in Europe thus restrict
competition between firms based on wages through
institutions that regulate pay at sectoral or even
national level. Likewise, Japanese firms utilize
strong norms of lifetime employment for their core
workforce while limiting external labor markets to
a very narrow range of specialists or to temporary
employees. While economists usually see these
restrictions as politically motivated, by the logic
of beneficial constraints, they may be economically
beneficial by providing an institutional basis on
which companies can develop and retain necessary
resources.
Rather than complementarities based on coher-
ence, we expect that firms facing radical innovation
in countries with liberal market institutions in
most domains may benefit from complementary
institutions that support coordination in employ-
ment relations. A combination of liberal and coor-
dinated institutions may be beneficial for dealing
with radical innovation by providing for both
flexibility in restructuring of economic organiza-
tion as well as trust and coordination to solve
problems of asymmetric information or hold-up.
Applying the same logic as Hall and Soskice (2001)
linking these benefits to comparative advantage, we
thus posit the following:
H2 Countries with coordinated institutions in
employment relations and liberal institutions in
other domains will show trade patterns consis-
tent with comparative advantage in industries
with radical innovation.
Beneficial constraints also extend to a second
argument. Similar to the inherent problems with
unconstrained market-oriented transactions, high
levels of coordination may lead to an overextension
of relational logics. To the extent that coordination
becomes strongly self-reinforcing, firms may lack
incentives to take risks and enter into new lines of
business – employment is long-term, firm-specific
skills are well developed, workers participate in firm
decision-making, inter-firm relations rely on
stable partners, and owners take a long-term strate-
gic view. These patterns may be beneficial in
stable industry environments characterized by low
levels of innovation or even incremental patterns,
as hypothesized by Varieties of Capitalism. How-
ever, it seems unlikely to these institutional
arrangements can support adjustments to more
radical and discontinuous forms of innovation
(Witt, 2006).
The potential deficits of high coordination may
create particular problems for shareholders, who
VOC and Comparative Advantage Michael A. Witt and Gregory Jackson
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are disadvantaged by low competitiveness. Conse-
quently, we see more liberal forms of corporate
governance as having potential to exert a counter-
balancing effect on high coordination and thus to
represent an economically beneficial compromise
between competing logics. Here firms benefit from
high coordination across different domains, includ-
ing employment relations, and develop strong
capabilities based on their human assets and rela-
tional linkages to other firms. However, a literature
on hybrid forms of corporate governance suggests
that increasing pressures from capital markets may
lead stakeholder-oriented firms to take bolder and
faster adjustments to changes in technology and
product markets (Vitols, 2002, 2004). For example,
Aoki (2010) argues that external monitoring of
internal linkages of corporate organization may be
beneficial in giving corporate insiders important
signals about their overall business strategy and
help benchmark their efforts against competitors.
Unlike monitoring by ‘‘patient’’ investors, a more
liberal market-oriented process may be a beneficial
resource for investors seeking to constrain the
tendencies toward stagnation among corporate
insiders, such as employees and managers. While
commitments to corporate stakeholders remains
strong, some pressure from capital markets and
influence from owners may help to catalyze more
dynamic, albeit ‘‘negotiated’’ responses to radical
innovations through more discontinuous manage-
ment strategies or changes in production technolo-
gies. Indeed, a growing literature on the relation
between corporate governance and employment
patterns suggest more complex relationships
between these variables than found in the Varieties
of Capitalism literature (Gospel & Pendleton,
2003, 2005; Ho¨pner, 2005). Despite their potential
to destabilize commitments to stakeholders, liberal
market institutions in corporate governance may
also potentially help counterbalance risk averse
tendencies of corporate insiders, thus paradoxically
helping to catalyze their dynamic potential in
terms of functional flexibility and ability to foster
trust, but here in the service of adjustments to
radical innovation. Applying the same logic about
the linkage to comparative advantage and trade, we
thus posit:
H3 Countries with liberal institutions in corpo-
rate governance and coordinated institutions in
other domains will show trade patterns consis-
tent with comparative advantage in industries
with radical innovation.
METHODOLOGY, DATA AND CALIBRATION
Methodology: fsQCA
We used fsQCA in Stata (StataCorp, 2013) as
provided by Longest and Vaisey (2008). Qualitative
comparative analysis draws on Boolean algebra to
determine which configurations of causal condi-
tions are related to an observed outcome (Ragin,
2000). The method is increasingly used in the
business and management literature (e.g., Bell,
Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 2013; Crilly, 2011; Fiss,
2011; Judge et al., 2015; Schneider et al., 2010).
We adopted fsQCA because of its distinct advan-
tages for studying institutional complementarities
(Jackson & Ni, 2013). First, fsQCA is well suited to
capture conjunctural types of causation that under-
lie theories of complementarity. Complementari-
ties are based on specific configurations where
multiple causal factors combine to produce an
outcome. Traditional statistical methods model
‘‘net effects’’ of single variables, while holding other
factors constant. While interaction effects can
capture specific conjunctions, such as radical inno-
vation with institutional coordination, these meth-
ods are not well suited to more complex
conjunctions. Consequently, most work on com-
parative capitalism has used factor analysis to
simplify institutional configurations into highly
simplified one-dimensional constructs (Hall & Gin-
gerich, 2009) or group countries into a limited
number of types (Amable, 2003), at the risk of
losing important distinctions in the process. fsQCA
does not require such simplifying steps. Second,
fsQCA can identify how multiple different combi-
nations of independent variables can produce the
same outcome (equifinality). Third, fsQCA evalu-
ates set theoretical relationships, rather than corre-
lations among different factors. This under-
appreciated facet allows for the possibility of
asymmetrical relationships, whereby high and low
values of the outcomes are driven by different
causal conditions. For example, if low coordination
and radicality are jointly sufficient for high perfor-
mance outcomes, it does not follow that coordina-
tion is sufficient for outcomes of low performance.
Finally, the method is not sensitive to outliers
because it does not assume an underlying proba-
bility distribution (Fiss, 2011).
Sample and Data Structure
Our dataset consists of 2772 observations, made up
of 14 industries at the 2-digit ISIC-3 level in 22
OECD countries, with annual observations from
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1995 through 2003. Each case is a particular
industry for a given country and year. The choice
of countries, industries, and years was affected by
data availability as explained below.
Outcome Measure: Contribution to the Trade
Balance
Our outcome measure was the contribution to the
trade balance for manufacturing industries. It is
based on the ‘‘Law of Comparative Advantage’’ in
economics (Dearsdorff, 1980), which states that
comparative advantages in manufacturing should
be revealed in trade patterns. Much of the eco-
nomics literature has measured revealed compara-
tive advantage using the Balassa (1965) index,
which compares a country’s export market share
in a given industry with the average export market
share of all countries. We followed an alternative
calculation used by the OECD (2003) that we
believe to have higher construct validity, as we will
explain below.
For each country, the contribution to the trade
balance (CTB in the formula) in the OECD concep-
tualization and as used in this article is computed as
follows:
CTB ¼ Xi Mið Þ  XMð Þ Xi þMið Þ
XþMð Þ ; ð1Þ
where (Xi - Mi) is the observed trade balance in
industry i in the given country and the remainder
for the formula is the theoretical trade balance for
this same industry i in the same country (OECD,
2003: 150). To make the results comparable across
countries, they are expressed a percentage of total
trade for the respective country. A positive value
denotes the presence of a comparative advantage, a
negative value, of a comparative disadvantage for
that country in a particular industry (OECD, 2013).
We obtained these data from the OECD (2013).
This measure improves over the Balassa index in
two important ways. First, it takes into account the
level of imports in a given industry. While the
Balassa index focuses entirely on exports and thus
cannot distinguish whether a country has a high
export market share because it produces much of
the value-added itself (a sign of comparative advan-
tage) or because it imports and re-exports (as in the
case of China already discussed), our measure can
distinguish between these two cases. Second, the
Balassa index is a measure of competitive advantage
rather than comparative advantage. Comparative
advantage exists within each country with respect
to other industries. This implies a need to compare
within countries, as our measure does, rather than
across countries, as the Balassa index does. For
example, assume that country A has two industries,
X and Y, and is better at producing goods in these
industries than any other country in the world.
This would give it a competitive (absolute) advan-
tage relative to other countries, which the Balassa
index would pick up as an advantage in both
industries. However, if country A is better at
producing X than at Y, we can say that it has a
comparative advantage at X over Y. The Balassa
index would miss this, while our preferred measure
would pick this up. For robustness testing, we will
later check our results against those of the Balassa
index.
In choosing our industries, we omitted low
technology industries, such as food and beverages,
textiles, and wood and cork. Low technology
industries are defined by the lowest research activ-
ity, which implies a weak link between innovation
and resultant comparative advantage. Our analy-
sis thus focused on low-medium technology,
medium–high technology, and high technology
sectors. Since the contribution to the trade balance
is likely to manifest itself with a delay after an
invention occurred, our analysis used a lead-time of
one year relative to the causal conditions (i.e., the
contribution to the trade balance in year 2004 will
be analyzed with respect to institutional factors for
2003).
Causal Conditions: Indicators of Radicality
and Institutional Coordination
Indicators of Radicality
Following Akkermans et al. (2009), we calculated
three distinct, patent-based measures to gauge the
extent of radical innovation in a given society. In
line with the prior literature, incremental innova-
tion is operationalized as the inverse of radical
innovation – innovations that are not radical are
assumed to be incremental. While we will later
question this assumption, we retained it since no
established measure of incremental innovation
exists in the literature.
In our first step, we obtained all entries from
1990 through 2005 of the NBER Patent-Citations
Data File (Hall, Bessen, & Thoma, 2011). This
database contains the patent number and three
indicators of radicality for each US patent issued
during this period: number of citations received,
generality, and originality. The number of citations
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received operationalizes the concept of radicality
by measuring the impact on future technological
development, as expressed in subsequent citations
by other patents. Generality refers to the propensity
of basic innovation to diffuse to many different
industries and areas of technology, that is, their
versatility. Originality expresses the idea that truly
radical innovations are likely to cite patents from
different areas of technology. Further explanations
of these measures are contained in the works of
Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg (2001) and Akkermans
et al. (2009).
For all three measures, the innovation literature
has interpreted higher numbers to indicate higher
levels of radicality (Akkermans et al., 2009). We
believe that of the three measures, the number of
citations received is likely to be closest to a valid
indicator of radicality. Similar to citations to
scholarly articles, citations to patents indicate their
impact. Just as highly cited articles are relatively
more likely to be in some way seminal than less
cited pieces, patents with higher citations counts
are likely to have a greater impact on the course of
technology development and thus represent radical
steps in technological development. We are less
convinced of the construct validity of the other two
measures. Breakthrough ideas in one area do not
necessarily have to be of interest to other areas, nor
do they need to assemble insights from many
different preexisting areas. Despite our doubts, we
retained both generality and originality for robust-
ness tests.
The raw data required two further steps for our
purposes. First, the generality and originality mea-
sures are defined as Herfindahl indexes and there-
fore not given for patents that received no citations
or contained no citations. In these cases, we
assigned a value of 0 for each measure. Second,
both measures are biased downward for patents
involving small numbers of citations (Hall, Jaffe, &
Trajtenberg, 2001). We corrected for this bias as
proposed in Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg (2001).
Since our outcome measure is categorized by
industries following the ISIC 3 classification
scheme, we next matched each patent with one
or several ISIC codes. The United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) assigns each patent to
one or several industries to which the patent is
likely to be relevant. While the original assignment
scheme is incompatible with ISIC classifications,
the USPTO identifies the SIC codes for each patent
in its PATSIC-CONAME database. We obtained the
year 2008 version of the database and matched the
contents of the NBER database with the PATSIC-
CONAME database using patent numbers, which
are contained in both databases.
We calculated the relative proportions of radi-
cally innovative patents by industry and country
for each of the three measures of radicality. Similar
to Akkermans et al. (2009), we define a patent to be
radically innovative if it scores higher than the
95th percentile for a given measure. For instance, if
the 95th percentile for citations received in the
pharmaceuticals industry was 15, we would count
as radical all patents with more than 15 citations
received. We consequently calculated the threshold
separately for each year because the year of publi-
cation of a patent affects how many citations it has
received, with younger patents on average receiv-
ing fewer citations than older ones.
In the final step, we calculated the proportion of
patents above the threshold in each country,
industry and year. To generate a more stable picture,
we assigned to each observation the three-year
average of these proportions from t - 2 years to t.
We discarded data from 2004 and 2005 because the
database ends in 2005, which means that there was
insufficient time for citations from these two years
to receive sufficient numbers of citations for dis-
criminating between radically and incrementally
innovative patents. Given the strong interest in
innovation patterns in the Varieties of Capitalism
debate, Table 1 shows the cross-tabulation of rad-
icality, using the citations received indicator, by
country and industry.
Institutional Indicators
The starting point in understanding institutions
was past work categorizing countries into either
LME or CME types of capitalism. However, different
studies based classifications on different institu-
tional domains and have made different assump-
tions about how institutions combine into these
broader types. For example, Hall and Gingerich
(2009) used confirmatory factor analysis to derive a
coordination index for 20 advanced industrialized
economies based on three corporate governance
and three employment relations variables. How-
ever, this approach covered only two of the five
institutional domains discussed by Varieties of
Capitalism (Hall & Soskice, 2001). In addition, the
construction of a single index assumes that com-
plementarities are achieved through cohesion (all
domains being either fully coordinated or fully
liberal), an assumption this paper seeks to relax and
test (H2, H3).3
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We thus considered all five domains: corporate
governance, inter-firm relations, hierarchies within
firms, employment relations, and education. For
each institutional domain, we conceptualized of
institutions as varying along a single dimension
spanning between liberal institutions characterized
by a high use of market relationships or transferable
assets and coordinated institutions characterized by
high use of long-term strategic relationships or
relationship-specific assets. We adopted a separate
indicator for each and later will explore the differ-
ent ways in which they combine into a number of
complex configurations.
In terms of corporate governance, we used three
indicators. First, an index of legal rules for share-
holder protection measures whether laws in a
country adopt particular protections related to
disclosure, voting rights, and so forth (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, & Vishney, 1998). Since
no alternative suitable measures exist, we took the
original indicator derived by LLSV (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999) and an updated mea-
sure for 2003 (Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, & Shleifer, 2004), interpolating annual
values based on the movement between these two
periods. Shareholder protection indicates the
degree to which business firms are likely to have a
liberal orientation toward shareholder control.
Second, we obtained stock market valuation as a
percentage of GDP from OECD statistics to capture
the salience of the stock market for company
financing. Third, we measured the dispersion of
share ownership by the percentage of large firms in
each country that have a blockholder with an
ownership stake of 10 % or greater. We used the
LLSV indicator of ownership dispersion based on
the percentage of large firms without an owner
holding a 10 % stake or more, and calculated our
own data for 2003 using ownership data from the
ownership module of Thomson Banker One. We
Table 1 Proportion of radical patents by citations received, by country and industry, 1995–2003
Industry AT AU BE CA DK FI FR DE GR IE IT
Aircraft, spacecraft 0.012 0.051 0.056 0.064 0.127 0.000 0.007 0.043 0.000 0.000 0.031
Basic metals 0.000 0.094 0.019 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.036 0.000 0.056 0.058
Chemicals other than pharmaceuticals 0.020 0.037 0.020 0.046 0.027 0.032 0.028 0.030 0.000 0.105 0.018
Electrical machinery 0.007 0.046 0.034 0.095 0.008 0.034 0.026 0.020 0.000 0.016 0.019
Machinery 0.017 0.036 0.028 0.053 0.015 0.023 0.017 0.022 0.000 0.042 0.012
Medical, precision, optical equipment 0.007 0.042 0.009 0.052 0.043 0.015 0.019 0.018 0.000 0.099 0.008
Metal products 0.039 0.038 0.038 0.066 0.025 0.016 0.030 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.024
Motor vehicles 0.041 0.018 0.028 0.084 0.028 0.019 0.024 0.037 0.000 0.053 0.020
Non-metallic products 0.006 0.079 0.016 0.067 0.023 0.026 0.030 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.018
Office, accounting, computing equipment 0.000 0.051 0.026 0.065 0.000 0.026 0.011 0.010 0.000 0.018 0.006
Other transport equipment 0.015 0.037 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.060 0.000 0.000 0.048
Pharmaceuticals 0.018 0.022 0.018 0.043 0.023 0.037 0.025 0.021 0.000 0.100 0.013
Radio, TV, communication equipment 0.008 0.048 0.023 0.072 0.002 0.066 0.019 0.015 0.000 0.044 0.004
Rubber, plastic 0.036 0.038 0.024 0.059 0.031 0.026 0.033 0.027 0.000 0.035 0.027
Average 0.016 0.046 0.024 0.060 0.025 0.023 0.023 0.028 0.000 0.041 0.022
Industry JP NL NO NZ PO KR ES SE CH UK US
Aircraft, spacecraft 0.073 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.021 0.002 0.015 0.065
Basic metals 0.038 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.111 0.000 0.037 0.055 0.081
Chemicals other than pharmaceuticals 0.031 0.027 0.032 0.033 0.037 0.025 0.035 0.052 0.041 0.033 0.072
Electrical machinery 0.038 0.020 0.021 0.082 0.000 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.015 0.035 0.076
Machinery 0.057 0.023 0.015 0.009 0.000 0.025 0.018 0.018 0.014 0.029 0.077
Medical, precision, optical equipment 0.017 0.033 0.024 0.005 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.022 0.029 0.025 0.074
Metal products 0.054 0.038 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.034 0.024 0.031 0.022 0.035 0.077
Motor vehicles 0.049 0.014 0.065 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.016 0.032 0.060 0.022 0.078
Non-metallic products 0.042 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.009 0.063 0.024 0.026 0.080
Office, accounting, computing equipment 0.011 0.021 0.139 0.037 0.000 0.008 0.037 0.038 0.005 0.027 0.077
Other transport equipment 0.076 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.031 0.071
Pharmaceuticals 0.011 0.055 0.093 0.028 0.000 0.019 0.025 0.057 0.052 0.045 0.074
Radio, TV, communication equipment 0.026 0.015 0.058 0.019 0.000 0.021 0.022 0.058 0.014 0.035 0.074
Rubber, plastic 0.039 0.036 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.034 0.063 0.034 0.030 0.080
Average 0.040 0.031 0.033 0.015 0.003 0.019 0.025 0.034 0.025 0.032 0.075
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interpolated annual data based on the year-to-year
changes between these two dates. High blockhold-
ing is associated with coordination.
For inter-firm relationships, we used two indica-
tors based on merger and acquisition activity from
the Capital IQ database. First, the number of
merger and acquisition deals by acquiring firms in
each country indicates the use of the market in
governing relationships between firms. While we
lack internationally comparable measures of coor-
dination such as that achieved through long-term
relational contracts in buyer–supplier relations,
prior literature (Schneider & Paunescu, 2012) sug-
gested that mergers and acquisitions indicate that
firms seek to obtain assets from target firms
through a market-driven acquisition of ownership
rights. Second, the proportion of merger and
acquisition deals that take the form of a full-scale
merger indicates the use of strong market relation-
ships. Mergers and acquisitions may involve arms’
length transactions, where control is purchased and
leads to the dissolution of a target firm, or acqui-
sitions of minority ownership stakes. In the latter
case, the target firms remain legally independent
but enter into a coordinated long-term relationship
with the acquiring firm.
For firm hierarchies, we examined the degree of
employee participation at the level of corporate
boards and through works councils and similar
labor-management consultation bodies. Board-
level employee representation has been categorized
based the percentage of employees on the board
and on whether codetermination requirements
apply broadly to all large private companies, are
restricted to public corporations, or do not exist at
all (Jackson, 2005). Strong legal rights to employee
representation on boards indicate long-term rela-
tional coordination of firm operations between
management and employees. In addition, many
countries anchor employee participation at the
level of the establishment or even workplace in
the form of works councils. We measured work
council rights by the rights to information, consul-
tation or even codetermination of managerial
decisions, as well as whether these rights pertain
to social or also economic matters of the enterprise
(Visser, 2011).
In terms of employment relations, we used three
indicators. First, we considered the duration of
tenure with a particular employer. Unfortunately,
existing data from the OECD do not permit detailed
cross-national comparisons of average job tenure or
the proportion of employees with very high tenure.
Thus we examined only the proportion of employ-
ees with short job tenure of less than one year.
While all countries have some new hires, a high
proportion of new hires indicate a more liberal
market-oriented to employment practices, whereas
a low proportion indicates that employment may
be more long-term and coordination. Second, we
examined the strictness of employment protection
for regular employees based on well-known OECD
indices. Greater difficulty in firing workers indicates
again a higher degree of coordination in employ-
ment relations. Finally, we measured the degree of
coordination in wage bargaining across firms,
industries and national levels. This indicator shows
the degree to which firms engage in individualized
market transactions in setting wages, or whether
these are coordinated with other employers in the
same industry or even nationally (Visser, 2011).
Finally, we used two indicators to examine the
characteristics of education and training institu-
tions. We drew on OECD statistics on the propor-
tion of graduates from different types of
educational institutions within the wider popula-
tion. First, we took the share of graduates from
upper secondary or post-secondary non-tertiary as
a broad indicator for occupationally-based voca-
tional training (Schneider et al., 2010). Second, we
used university training, as measured by the
number of graduates from university as a share
of the population in the typical graduation age
range, as an indicator of general training (Schnei-
der et al., 2010). Taken together, these indicators
show the importance of two pathways toward
skilled workforces based either on more occupa-
tionally based and thus relationship-specific train-
ing in particular occupations, which reflect higher
degrees of coordination, or on university-based
education that offers more general set of skills that
tend to be portable across firms or very broad
range of jobs according to individual career
trajectories.
Table 2 presents an overview of the descriptive
statistics for all indicators used in the study.
Calibration
fsQCA requires calibration of all data into set
membership scores that fall between 0 (full absence
of the given causal condition) to 1 (full presence)
(Ragin, 2008). Calibration combines information
about qualitative differences in kind (e.g., countries
with or without employee participation in firm
hierarchies) with information about differences in
degree (e.g., different degrees of participation).
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Ragin (2008) stresses using external benchmarks
rather than sample variance in defining thresholds
for set membership. Rather than assuming that
being ‘‘above average’’ or ‘‘below average’’ on a
particular indicator is sufficient for having high or
low membership in a particular set, the extent of
membership depends on theoretical criteria and
substantive knowledge of the cases at hand. While
we adopt this qualitative approach to data calibra-
tion, the results of our calibration scoring correlate
at levels of 95 % or above with scores derived from
more automated coding procedures such as using a
standardized rank ordering of cases.
Table 3 presents a summary of all data sources,
the calibrations of each institutional indicator and
construction of higher-order constructs used in the
empirical analysis.
We combined the indicators into five higher-
order constructs, one for each domain, taking the
minimum score among the selected indicators for
each country (on set operators logical AND and OR,
see Ragin, 2008), whereby higher membership were
coded to indicate greater coordination. Firm hier-
archy is the membership in the set of countries with
both high coordination for board codetermination
and works councils. Inter-firm relations are highly
coordinated in countries with both low mergers
and acquisitions per capita and where full mergers
are not the predominant form of mergers and
acquisitions. Education is highly coordinated in
countries that have high occupational training
and low university education. Membership in the
set of countries with coordinated corporate gover-
nance was based on three indicators: the absence of
dispersed ownership and either weak stock markets
or weak shareholder rights. Before combining with
the ownership condition, we first took the maxi-
mum score for membership in the set of countries
with an absence of stock market activity or weak
shareholder rights. We treat these as functionally
equivalents for coordination, since the absence of
either condition means that managers are unlikely
to feel strong pressures from shareholders. Turning
to employment relations, high coordination is pre-
sent in countries with coordinated wage bargaining
and either long employee tenures or strong
employment protection. Again, the outcomes of
high tenure or legal protection of regular workers
are treated as functionally equivalent indicators of
long-term employment relations.
Table 4 presents a summary overview of our
calibrated measures for each country, showing
whether they fall into more coordinated or more
liberal ‘‘types’’ for each institutional domain based
on the average scores across the period 1995–2003.
In our analysis, we did not use these averages but
yearly indicators, since many countries actually
changed configurations during this time period.
To calibrate set membership for radicality, we
considered membership in the set of industries
with high radicality based on the proportion of
patents that are highly cited. Similar to the contri-
bution to the trade balance measure, we calibrated
radicality in terms of the concentration of radical
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Indicator N Mean SD Min Max
1 Shareholder protection 198 3.24 1.1 0 5
2 Dispersion of control 198 0.33 0.24 0 0.9
3 Size of stock market 198 78.5 54.19 8.92 317.03
4 Mergers and acquisitions 198 0.24 0.27 0 1.1
5 Mergers 198 0.38 0.19 0 1
6 Wage coordination degree 198 0.18 0.06 0.08 0.41
7 Short-term employment 198 3.07 1.25 1 5
8 Employment protection 198 2.06 0.86 0.17 4.33
9 Board-level codetermination 198 0.43 0.39 0 1
10 Works council rights 198 1.19 1.1 0 3
11 Occupational training 198 43.89 19.25 2 82
12 University training 198 29.5 9.7 9 53.3
13 Radicality, citations received 198 0.03 0.04 0 0.42
16 Radicality, generality 198 0.04 0.04 0 0.48
17 Radicality, originality 198 0.07 0.06 0 0.67
14 Contribution to the trade balance 198 -0.12 1.72 -7.33 10.9
15 Balassa index 198 0.92 0.73 0 6.32
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innovations in particular industries relative to the
mean level of radical innovations for each country.
We considered citations in the bottom 25 % and
top 75 % to be fully out or fully in the set of
highly cited patents, whereas zero difference with
the country mean would indicate a crossover
point between comparative disadvantage or
advantage for that industry relative to overall
country performance. While this indicators looks
at relative advantages of countries across indus-
tries, the results of our fsQCA analysis proved
identical to an alternative calibration that directly
compared the proportion of radical patents in
each industry between different countries. In order
to further check the robustness of this radicality
measure, we applied the same procedure to mea-
sures of radicality based on generality or original-
ity dimensions, and then constructed a higher-
order set membership scores for radical innovation
based on citations received, originality or
generality.
Finally, our outcome condition of contribution
to the trade balance was calibrated based on -2 as
being fully out, 2 as being fully in, and zero as the
cross-over point. Substantively, the contribution
to the trade balance score of zero offers an
intuitive crossover point, since this score repre-
sents no comparative advantage or disadvantage.
The anchors for no and full membership are
slightly greater than two standard deviations
around the crossover point. This calibration cor-
relates highly with the rank ordering of cases, and
our results proved robust to alternative anchor
points.4
Data Analysis
Our analysis used fsQCA to evaluate which of the 26
possible combinations of causal conditions (where
6 represents 5 institutional conditions plus indus-
try-level radicality) are sufficient conditions for the
outcome of high contribution to the trade balance.
In evaluating the data, our solutions needed to
meet several thresholds (e.g., Fiss, 2011; Judge
et al., 2015; Ragin, 2008). First, we accepted only
solutions with a consistency score (a measure of
reliability) that showed a statistically significant
level above the common benchmark of 0.80.
Second, we excluded any solutions that were
simultaneously consistent with the negation of
the outcome. This problem of simultaneous subsets
is possible where set membership in causal condi-
tions is very low (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).
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cases. Standard applications of fsQCA are usually
small-N, with a common threshold of two cases
(e.g., Fiss, 2011). Since we are using fsQCA in a large
N setting, we chose a stricter threshold on the
consideration that any valid solution would have to
contain observations from about two years or two
industries per country. Solutions with fewer cases
than 40 were treated as being inconsistent. We
confirmed robustness of this choice by increasing
and decreasing the threshold. Finally, our analysis
does not contain any strictly directional hypothe-
ses linking institutional factors to comparative
advantage outcomes, since our hypotheses suggest
that both liberal and coordinated institutions may
lead to comparative advantage under certain con-
ditions. Thus while we identify the ‘‘core condi-
tions’’ as provided by the parsimonious solutions
(cf. Fiss, 2011), we do not postulate any ‘‘easy
counterfactuals’’ to be used as simplifying
assumptions and interpret the results of the fsQCA
complex solutions only.
RESULTS
Table 5 shows the results of our analysis. It suggests
three pathways to high contribution to the trade
balance, with a coverage of 0.482 (i.e., they jointly
explain 48.2 % of membership in our dataset).
Consistency levels (similar to statistical signifi-
cance) are all high throughout at levels of 0.914
and higher, which is considerably better than the
commonly used minimum threshold of 0.800.
Solution 1 combines low radicality with high
coordination across all institutional spheres. This
corresponds to incremental innovation producing
a comparative advantage in CMEs and thus offers
partial support of H1. Austria follows this CME
pattern, achieving comparative advantage across a
Table 4 Set membership of countries in highly coordinated institutions, 1995–2003 average
Note: Set membership scores 0.5–1 indicate medium to full membership in the category of high coordinated, whereas scores 0 to 0.5 indicate zero to
medium membership (shaded cells) in the set of coordinated countries and thereby displaying liberal institutional features.
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range of industries such as office equipment,
aircraft, and metals. Notably, Austrian industries
experienced only incremental forms of innovation,
while radical innovation was essentially absent.
However, this result only gives partial support for
H1, as the second pattern predicted by H1, high
radicality with low coordination across all institu-
tional spheres, is absent from the set of solutions.
Solution 2 combines radicality with low coordina-
tion in all institutional spheres except employment
relations. Interestingly, inter-firm relations are irrele-
vant to this solution and may be either liberal or
coordinated. This result is consistent with H2 and
describes Japan (e.g., motor vehicles, aircraft), Switzer-
land during the late 1990s (e.g., chemicals), and
Ireland (e.g., chemicals, medical equipment sectors)
as key cases. While Japan is often seen as an exemplar
of CMEs (e.g., Witt, 2006; Yamamura& Streeck, 2003),
albeit with unusual characteristics, our measures
present a different picture. Japan is characterized by
a fairly liberal set of institutions – education is focused
more on university graduates with general skills,
employee voice in firm hierarchies is not strongly
rooted in law, and after substantial changes to corpo-
rate governance during the 1990s, shareholder rights
and patterns of corporate ownership became fairly
liberal. Nonetheless, Japanese firms sustained ‘‘micro-
corporatist’’ arrangements within the domain of
employment relations based on strong employment
protection and low labor turnover. Unlike more pure
LME economies, stable employment is core to the
success of Japanese manufacturing, such as Toyota.
Solution 3 combines high radicality with high
coordination in all institutional spheres except for
corporate governance, which is consistent with H3.
Germany falls into this category and achieved high
comparative advantage in motor vehicles, chemicals,
pharmaceuticals, machinery and metal products. Dur-
ing the 1990s, Germany underwent substantial liber-
alization of its corporate governance arrangements,
despite relative continuity of its coordinated employ-
ment relations and strong occupational training insti-
tutions (Jackson, 2003). During this period, changes in
corporate governance exerted substantial pressure on
organized labor to cooperate in firm restructuring and
support changes in business models. This, we argue,
ultimately served here as a type of ‘‘beneficial con-
straint’’ on coordinated patterns of business organiza-
tion in the sense of balancing the logic of coordination
with a stronger market-orientation. The importance of
this ‘‘opposing’’ institutional logic is clear if we com-
pare Germany to its neighboring Austria, which
represents a pure CME-type of economy and excelled
only in incrementally innovative industries with a
notable absence of success with radical innovation.
We conducted a number of robustness tests. First,
we used a more stringent calibration of the dependent
variable measuring contribution to the trade balance
by changing the anchor points for low and high
contribution to the trade balance from -2 to -4 and
?2 to ?4, respectively. This produced precisely the
same three solutions as our main model. Coverage
dropped minimally from 0.485 to 0.482, while con-
sistency improved from 0.914 to 0.933. Second, we
used the Balassa index instead of contribution to the
trade balance as a dependent variable. This produced a
single solution that is identical with Solution 3 in our
main model (describing the case of Germany). Cover-
age was 0.194, consistency, 0.925. This lends support
to H3 only. At the same time, given the issues with
construct validity of the Balassa index as noted earlier,
we are not very confident that this support, or the lack
Table 5 Sufficient conditions for high revealed comparative advantage




Education and skills coordination
Firm hierarchy coordination
Interfirm coordination
Raw coverage 0.170 0.376 0.177
Unique coverage 0.057 0.248 0.026
Consistency 0.939 0.928 0.949
Total coverage, all solutions 0.482
Solution consistency, all solutions 0.914
Note: = presence of condition, = absence of condition, blank = absence or presence does not matter; large symbols show core conditions
(parsimonious solution).
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of support of the other hypotheses, is particularly
meaningful. Third, we used a more comprehensive
measure of radicality. The three measures of radicality
discussed earlier – number of patents received, origi-
nality, and generality – represent functional substi-
tutes in that all three have been described as potential
expressions of radicality in innovation. Following
Ragin’s (2008) approach for functional substitutes, we
combined all three variables using an OR operator –
that is, the highest value of any of these three variables
became the radicality measure for each given data
point. This model produced two solutions, which are
equivalent to Solutions 2 and 3 in our main model.
Joint coverage was 0.362, and all consistency scores
were above 0.908. This provides additional support of
H2 and H3, but no support of H1.
Overall, these results offer strong support of H3
and, given our doubts about the Balassa index, H2.
Partial support of H1 is confined to our main model
and thus seems more tentative.
Unlike in correlational methods, solutions consis-
tent with high and low contribution to the trade
balance are not necessarily symmetrical in fsQCA
(Schneider&Wagemann,2012).Theadditional results
in Table 6 are helpful in interpreting our findings for
the main model. Solutions 1 and 4 show that low
contribution to the trade balance is consistent with
countries with liberal institutions across 3 or 4 insti-
tutional domains and the absence of radical innova-
tion. This finding is essentially a mirror of Solution 1 in
Table 5, but shows that countries approximating LME-
type configurations do not achieve comparative
advantage in industries with low radicality. Solution
2 describes several Nordic cases, such as Norway,
DenmarkandFinlandthathavecoordinatedcorporate
governance and firm hierarchies with liberal inter-firm
relations and education. This configuration is consis-
tently associated with low contribution to trade
balance in industries if radical innovation is absent.
Unlike pure CMEs, coordination is absent in certain
domains such as employment relations, being rather
focused on a more liberal flexicurity employment
model. At the same time, coordinated corporate
governance does not act as a beneficial constraint vis-
a`-vis market-oriented employment patterns, since
concentrated share ownership is not sufficient in itself
to induce investments in firm-specific skills and
capacities needed for incremental innovation. In
addition, Solution 3 shows a configuration for low
contribution to the trade balance describing Greece
and Portugal, as well as some years for New Zealand
and Spain. This configuration shows that radicality is
associated with poor performance where coordinated
institutions for corporate governance and inter-firm
relations are mixed with liberal patterns for firm
hierarchies and education. Despite the mix of coordi-
nated and liberal elements, the configuration lacks
complementarities based on beneficial constraints.
Again, coordinated corporate governance, such as
highly concentrated ownership patterns, or weak
M&A activity in inter-firm relations do not act as a
constraining counterbalance to liberal market-ori-
ented patterns of education and employment. As
such, these particular ‘‘mixed market economies’’ fail
to obtain comparative advantage in radical industries
(Hancke´, Rhodes, & Thatcher, 2007).
DISCUSSION
In this article we used fsQCA to examine how
country-level institutional configurations relate to
institutional comparative advantage across
Table 6 Sufficient conditions for low revealed comparative advantage




Education and skills coordination
Firm hierarchy coordination
Interfirm coordination
Raw coverage 0.345 0.199 0.283 0.408
Unique coverage 0.008 0.048 0.120 0.042
Consistency 0.880 0.921 0.914 0.854
Total coverage, all solutions 0.595
Solution consistency, all solutions 0.844
Note: = presence of condition, = absence of condition, blank = absence or presence does not matter; large symbols show core conditions
(parsimonious solution).
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different industrial sectors characterized by either
more radical or incremental patterns of innovation.
Our main finding is that radical innovation con-
sistently leads to high comparative advantage in
countries with institutions that combine specific
liberal and coordinated elements: Radical innova-
tion leads to comparative advantage in economies
with predominantly liberal institutions but coordi-
nated employment relations and, conversely, in
economies with predominantly coordinated insti-
tutions but liberal corporate governance. We inter-
pret these ‘‘mixed’’ or hybrid combinations of
liberal and coordinated institutions as having
complementarities derived from beneficial con-
straints, whereby an institutional logic of either
market or coordinated exchange is counter-bal-
anced by an opposing institutional logic.
One implication of our results relates to the
validity of the Varieties of Capitalism hypothesis
(H1). While we find some evidence that CMEs have
an institutional comparative advantage in indus-
tries with incremental innovation, the data show
no indication that LMEs have an institutional
comparative advantage in industries with radical
innovation. Additional regression analysis,
reported in the Appendix, also shows no clear
support of H1. This lack of strong and consistent
support based on state-of-the-art measures and
methodology suggests that the Varieties of Capital-
ism framework needs substantial reinterpretation
and further theoretical development.
At the same time, our results are broadly consis-
tent with earlier studies linking performance in
certain sectors with institutional configurations
that go beyond the LME and CME dichotomy. For
example, Boyer (2004) explored what institutional
configurations are consistent with a technology-led
growth regime based on information and commu-
nications technology. He identified three different
configurations, none consistent with Hall and
Soskice’s (2001) notion of complementarities
through coherence. Similarly, Schneider et al.
(2010) linked hybrid economies with mixed insti-
tutional logics to strong export performance in
high technology industries. Our article lends addi-
tional support to the argument that certain types of
hybrids may be more successful than the pure types
envisioned by Hall and Soskice (2001).
The key contribution here is to go beyond these
previous studies by offering an ex ante prediction of
the kinds of results we expect to see, drawing on the
concept of beneficial constraints. This approach,
which builds on Streeck (1997), allowed us to
theorize how complementarities may alternatively
be based on the combination of conflicting insti-
tutional logics. Here complementarities may result
from opposing logics, in which liberal and coordi-
nated institutions compensate for one another.
Specifically, coordinated employment relations
institutions may constrain the influence of liberal
markets, thereby enabling firms to make and
protect investments in core human resources.
Meanwhile, in highly coordinated economies, lib-
eral corporate governance may act as an external
monitor that constrains the behavior of company
stakeholders, but in ways that also enable more
rapid and successful adaptation to radical innova-
tion. Nonetheless, our analysis shows clearly that
not all hybrid combinations of markets and coor-
dination achieve these sorts of beneficial con-
straints. In mixed market economies, such as
Greece of Portugal, neither does liberal corporate
governance act as an external monitor for highly
coordinated patterns of organization, nor does
coordinated employment relations serve as a con-
straint of liberal market organization. Of course,
our analysis leaves a number of cases unexplained,
which suggests a research agenda to better map and
test hybrid institutional logics based on beneficial
constraints.
Complementarities based on opposing principles
of social organization have a further and poten-
tially wide-ranging implication: that complemen-
tarities should be understood as political projects,
not equilibrium outcomes. For example, as Ger-
many faced economic turmoil in the early 1990s,
the political process of liberalization triggered a
process where more coordinated employment rela-
tions were defended and adapted to new con-
straints of more liberal corporate governance.
While this institutional dynamism may have ener-
gized the economy, one consequence has been
increasing inequality and the political temptation
to liberalize institutions further, which may undo
the success (Streeck, 2009). Thus new hybrid con-
figurations of institutions are no more stable equi-
libria than more coherent configurations; rather,
institutions change dynamically all the time. The
Celtic Tiger or Danish flexicurity are other good
examples. These ‘‘success models’’ of one era even-
tually run their course, often because the winners
and losers of changing institutional arrangements
push for further processes of institutional change
(Thelen, 2014). As countries travel past certain
windows, they may gain comparative advantages,
but these combinations of institutional
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arrangements may eventually exhaust themselves
as other countries and innovation patterns change
in unison (Boyer, 2004). Here a key finding of our
study is that the competitive advantage of Ger-
many was based not simply on its presumed
character as an ideal–typical CME country; rather,
it did better than pure CMEs like Austria by
incorporating hybrid institutional logics. Similarly,
we can go beyond other country stereotypes in the
literature to compare other unexpected pairs, such
as Ireland and Japan. Rather than being opposed as
LME and CME types, we can further investigate the
parallel ways in which these countries combine
liberal institutions with high coordination in
employment relations.
Our findings also add to the still relatively sparse
literature linking the comparative capitalism liter-
ature to economic outcomes. There is little doubt
that there are institutional differences, but the ‘‘so
what?’’ – whether and where these variations
matter – has been much less explored. Our study
finds that institutional comparative advantage may
indeed exist, though possibly not in the manner
previously envisaged. Importantly, this suggests
adopting research designs that allow for causal
complexity and equifinality, whereby different
institutional structures can lead to similar out-
comes. The original Varieties of Capitalism
approach (Hall & Soskice, 2001) suggested equifi-
nality between CMEs and LMEs with respect to
overall economic wealth, but posited a more simple
relationship between LMEs and the ability to
leverage radical innovation. By contrast, our results
suggest that at least two different institutional
configurations are associated with comparative
advantage in the presence of radical innovation.
Furthermore, these configurations are dramatically
different: either all elements but corporate gover-
nance are coordinated, or all but employment
relations are liberal.
Our conceptualization of complementarities
based on opposing logics and the empirical results
on equifinality challenge some existing conceptu-
alizations of institutional differences in Interna-
tional Business. For example, recent works have
already noted that the impact of distances may not
be symmetric or even indicative of difficulty oper-
ating abroad (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2012). In
this context, we hope that our approach can help
provide a basis for future empirical work on the
economic impact of Varieties of Capitalism in
particular and of institutional differences in Inter-
national Business more generally. Our study shows
the potential benefits of using fsQCA to elucidate
the conjunctural effects of different combinations
of institutional indicators (Ragin, 2008). While
previous studies have applied fsQCA methods to
the Varieties of Capitalism literature, our results are
broadly consistent with past results that have
linked more complex institutional configurations
that go beyond the simple LME and CME types
with stronger economic growth or export perfor-
mance (Kogut & Ragin, 2006; Schneider et al.,
2010). The multidimensionality evident in our
analysis calls for international business scholars to
pay greater attention to differences in kinds of
institutions and their combination, rather than
conceptualizing of institutions as one-dimensional
differences in degrees, as done widely in literatures
on institutional distance, institutional develop-
ment or even Varieties of Capitalism (Jackson &
Deeg, 2008). It also suggests that benefits usually
associated with social structures may be contingent
on the presence of other, supportive institutional
structures. For instance, while our analysis gener-
ally supports the widely accepted notion that
interorganizational networks may produce benefi-
cial outcomes (e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998; Sako,
1992), Solution 3 in Table 6 suggests that in some
configurations, they may be associated with weak
performance.
Our findings may further have important impli-
cations for understanding the location choices of
multinational enterprises (MNEs) seeking to avoid
home country disadvantages, project competitive
advantages related to their home country, or
exploit complementary resources and knowledge
related to host country institutional environments
(cf. Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Singh, 2007; Witt &
Lewin, 2007). The literature has previously identi-
fied host country institutions as sources of loca-
tional advantages (Dunning and Lundan 2008),
which suggests the possibility of institutional arbi-
trage (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Witt & Lewin, 2007):
Firms may move their operations, in part or in
whole, to institutional contexts that better support
these operations. The Varieties of Capitalism liter-
ature would have suggested that firms should locate
activities involving radical innovations in LMEs
such as the United States. Our results suggest a
different picture: Production involving radical
innovation seems to thrive in economies pairing
either liberal corporate governance with coordina-
tion in the other spheres of the political economy,
or coordinated employment relations with formally
liberal institutions in other areas. These patterns are
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far more complex than connections between insti-
tutions and locational choices of MNEs previously
explored in the literature, such as political risk or
corruption (Henisz, 2002; Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck,
& Eden, 2005). At the same time, it is possible that
experience and evolutionary processes have shaped
MNE investment patterns accordingly. To the
extent this is the case, one would expect that MNEs
relying more on radical innovations locate rela-
tively more of their activities in these economies.
One would also expect that the performance of
MNEs relying more on radical innovations should
correspond to the extent to which they locate their
operations in economies with suitable institutional
configurations. Exploring these hypotheses would
seem to be a fruitful avenue for future IB research.
Limitations
Though our empirical findings are robust to a large
number of alternative specifications, they have
important methodological limitations.
First, our results may be limited to the specific time
frame and country sample. Our study is based on a
9-year window from 1995 through 2003, for reasons
of data availability as explained earlier. This period
covers the time period for which the Varieties of
Capitalism approach claimed validity (cf. Hall &
Gingerich, 2009) and constitutes a strong test of the
original hypothesis. Nonetheless, as newer data
become available, future studies might examine
whether the hypothesized comparative advantages
manifest themselves post-2003. For example, the full
effects of the Internet revolution, shifts in biotech-
nology or expansion of global value chains may be
clearer over a longer time span. Moreover, while our
sample covers all countries discussed by Hall and
Soskice, and while Varieties of Capitalism theory
focuses on advanced industrialized economies, it is
possible that a larger range of countries might lead to
more comprehensive insights.
A second limitation concerns the construct valid-
ity of the coordination and radicality measures.
Concerning the former, Hall and Soskice discussed
the notion of transferable versus relational assets
across the five institutional domains of corporate
governance and finance, employment relations,
education, managerial hierarchies within firms,
and inter-firm relations. However, little consensus
exists about which institutional indicators should
be used to best capture ‘‘coordination’’ in each
domain. While we believe that our variables max-
imized construct validity to the extent possible,
better measures may become available.
In terms of radicality, we faced the same problem
that has plagued all prior attempts at exploring the
hypothesis: how to measure it. Our operationaliza-
tion follows procedures used and accepted by the
specialist literature on R&D. However, patent data
and even patent citations have well-known limita-
tions. Not all innovations can be patented (e.g.,
new software), and firms do not necessarily patent
their innovations for cost or strategic reasons
(Archibugi & Planta, 1996). Moreover, radical
innovation may also be associated with process
innovations driven by changes in organization for
which new technology is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition. Our results analyze the impact
of radicality across a wide range of industries, but
different dynamics may occur and different insti-
tutional features may be salient within specific
industries. As such, our article does not exhaust this
agenda.
The notion of radicality can also be questioned at
a deeper level. It remains unclear whether radical
innovation is properly understood at the level of
patents, meaning proprietary inventions, or
whether it entails shifts in broader technological
paradigms independent of particular inventions or
applications. For example, major shifts in informa-
tion technology are not centered on single radical
inventions, but may imply a radical shift in busi-
ness models or the locus of competitive advantage.
These broader phenomena, like the information
technology revolution, may give firms in LMEs new
opportunities to leverage institutions for fast entry
and exit from lines of business, or to use external
labor markets to retool their human capital and
organizational capabilities. But we cannot discount
the idea that firms in CMEs will leverage their
institutions to make incremental innovations
around this same context, whereby information
technologies are integrated successfully into estab-
lished product lines in ways leading to quality or
process improvements. Put differently, comparative
advantage may be reconceived as being less cen-
tered on advantages related to a fixed boundary of
an industry or technology. Rather, innovation may
be refracted through the lens of institutions in ways
that are leveraged for more radical or incremental
shifts in business strategy and organization. Here
multinational firms with capabilities for institu-
tional bricolage may have distinctive advantages.
Indeed, research on Central and Eastern Europe has
started to find competitive advantage in high-tech
industries based on strong FDI with complex insti-
tutional hybrids that involve combinations of
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liberal elements with either strong employee par-
ticipation or longer-term employment relations
(Allen & Aldred, 2011). As such, we think the
agenda of understanding how coordinated rela-
tions act as beneficial constraints on markets has a
long future ahead.
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NOTES
1Porter’s (1990) work on the competiveness of
nations has been an important influence in the
development of these new approaches. We exclude
it from the discussion because Porter’s focus is on
competitiveness and thus on absolute advantage
rather than on comparative advantage.
2On the notion of institutions as resources more
generally, see also Hall and Thelen (2009) and Jackson
and Deeg (2008).
3This original index has also important empirical
limitations, please refer to the Appendix.
4Generally, raising thresholds for full membership
produced very similar results, whereas lowering
thresholds to just one standard deviation produced
fewer consistent results, as the resultant calibration no
longer distinguishes between cases of high and very
high contributions to the trade balance.
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APPENDIX
As a robustness test, we used regression analysis to
undertake an alternative test of H1. Regression
analysis is not suitable for testing H2 and H3
because the configurational logic of these argu-
ments would involve 6-way interaction terms.
However, the argument of coherence across all 5
spheres of the political economy inherent in H1
makes it possible to derive a single ‘‘coordination
index’’ to use in a 2-way interaction. While fsQCA
still remains the method of choice for this kind of
investigation, not least because of its ability to
accommodate asymmetric solutions (see discussion
in the main text), we present this additional test as
a robustness check.
This Appendix reports the data, and methodol-
ogy and main results. The results depend on the
operationalization of the dependent variable: our
preferred measure, contributions to the trade bal-
ance, does not support H1, while the Balassa index
as an alternative offers inconsistent support of H1.
Data
Dependent variables were the contribution to the
trade balance plus the Balassa index, as discussed in
the main text.
The independent variable of interest was the
interaction term between radicality by number of
citations received and the coordination index we
introduce below. To account for possible direct
effects, we also included both the radicality mea-
sure and the coordination measure in the
regression.
Coordination
For each country and year, we calculated an index
of overall coordination. Hall and Gingerich (2009)
used confirmatory factor analysis to derive a coor-
dination index for 20 advanced industrialized
economies, with index values closer to 0 denoting
higher similarity with the prototypical LME and
closer to 1, with the prototypical CME. Their
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coordination index is based on three indicators of
corporate governance and finance (an index of
shareholder protection, dispersion of control, and
the size of stock market) and three indicators of
employment relations (the level of wage bargain-
ing, the degrees of coordination in wage bargain-
ing, and the proportion of employees with tenures
of less than 1 year). This original index has a
number of limitations that made it unsuitable for
our study. First, it provides a point estimate for
about the mid-1990s rather than a time-series over
the period of our study. Second, the original factor
scores calculated in Hall and Gingerich combined
indicators from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s.
When synchronizing the data as an annual time
series for 1995–2003, we found that the indicators
did not load on a common underlying factor when
applying confirmatory factor analysis as used by
Hall and Gingerich.
We developed an alternative specification of the
coordination index using principal component
analysis for the period 1995 through 2003. We drew
on the 12 indicators used in our main fsQCA model
as described in Table 2 of the main text. This set of
indicators is more comprehensive that those used by
Hall and Gingerich but were inspired by the 5
institutional domains described in the original for-
mulation of Varieties of Capitalism by Hall and
Soskice (2001). Taking z-transformed variables to
create a uniform scale, we used the principal-factor
method in Stata (StataCorp, 2011) to calculate a
single factor loading using squared multiple corre-
lations to estimate the commonality of an underly-
ing factor. The single largest factor had a factor
loading of 74 % and a large eigenvalue of 4.14,
suggesting a strong correlation along this single
dimension of coordination. The second factor had
an eigenvalue of 1.14 and explained an additional
20.7 % of the variation, which suggests that some
important variance is not fully captured in a single
index. However, since we are interested in the extent
to which countries vary on a single dimension, we
did not interpret any of the other factor scores.
Figure A1 shows the factor scores for countries in
our sample over time. While there is some move-
ment of CMEs toward the LME end of the spec-
trum, supporting the notion that economies
liberalized in the 1990s and early 2000s, we did
not observe any major changes in the general
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Figure A1 Coordination index, 1995–2003.
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We used this variable in its interaction with
radicality (which then provided the independent
variable of interest for testing H1) and its direct effect
in the regression to control for the possibility that
coordination in itself affects revealed comparative
advantages without interacting with radicality.
Control variables included the following:
Number of patents This industry-level control
variable is the natural logarithm of the number of
patents in the given country, industry, and year
(OECD, 2013). It controlled for the possibility that
greater contributions to the trade balance in a given
industry may be the result of higher levels of
innovation in general, as opposed to radical
innovation.
Corruption levels and regulatory quality These coun-
try-level control variables are the corruption per-
ception index, obtained from Transparency
International (2013), and the regulatory quality
measures from the World Bank Development
Indicators database (2013). They controlled for
the possibility that institutional shortcomings may
prevent patent owners from making full use of
their patents, which could reduce contributions to
the trade balance an economy can derive from
radical innovations.
EU, NAFTA These country-level control variables
are dummy variables coded 1 if the respective
country was a member of the EU or NAFTA and 0
otherwise. It controlled for the possibility that
membership in these free trade areas may have an
impact on the structure of trade of a country and
thus on the structure of contributions to the trade
balance.
GDP per capita This country-level control variable
is the natural logarithm of per capita GDP at
purchasing power parity and constant year 2000
US dollars (OECD, 2013). It controlled for possible
structural effects in contributions to the trade
balance based on higher levels of economic
development. For instance, it is possible that
higher GDP levels may be associated with greater
comparative advantage in higher technology
industries.
GERD per GDP This country-level control variable
is the ratio of Gross Expenses on R&D over GDP
(OECD, 2013). It controlled for possible effects that
higher levels of spending on R&D in an economy
may have on contributions to the trade balance.
We further included dummies for all years in the
sample. Table A2 shows descriptive statistics for all
variables.
Table A1 Coordination index for 22 OECD countries, 1995–2003
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Australia 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.20 0.13 0.11 0.09
Austria 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.85 0.82
Belgium 0.92 0.88 0.86 0.80 0.75 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.67
Canada 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.13
Denmark 0.68 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.61 0.61 0.54 0.52 0.51
Finland 0.64 0.64 0.62 0.59 0.58 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.47
France 0.60 0.60 0.58 0.57 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.57
Germany 0.90 0.88 0.86 0.84 0.82 0.80 0.77 0.75 0.74
Greece 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.56
Ireland 0.37 0.34 0.31 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.26
Italy 0.76 0.72 0.71 0.70 0.68 0.66 0.64 0.62 0.60
Japan 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.30
Netherlands 0.79 0.77 0.76 0.71 0.69 0.65 0.63 0.65 0.65
New Zealand 0.33 0.26 0.25 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.13
Norway 0.71 0.69 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.56 0.59 0.59 0.58
Portugal 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.50 0.48 0.47 0.43 0.43 0.41
South Korea 0.52 0.49 0.46 0.45 0.41 0.37 0.33 0.31 0.27
Spain 0.40 0.41 0.39 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.36
Sweden 0.73 0.72 0.70 0.67 0.63 0.61 0.58 0.58 0.56
Switzerland 0.65 0.61 0.57 0.55 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.51 0.52
UK 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.06
USA 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.18
Note: Higher values indicate higher levels of CME-style coordination.
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Model Specification
We used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), as
implemented in the ‘‘mixed’’ command in Stata
13.1 (StataCorp, 2013). This choice was condi-
tioned by the presence of multiple violations of
the assumption that data are independent and
identically distributed. Specifically, we expected
clustering effects at two levels, country and indus-
try. In line with the Varieties of Capitalism
approach, we assumed that country-level charac-
teristics supersede industry-level characteristics and
consequently specified a three-level HLM model
that nested observations first in industries and then
in countries. We further specified robust standard
errors with correction for AR(1) autoregressive
effects. Robustness tests with AR(2) and AR(3)
specification yielded qualitatively identical results.
Results
Models (1) through (3) in Table A3 show the build-
up to our main model (3), which is a three-level
HLM specification regressing the contribution to
the trade balance variable on the interaction of
coordination and radicality expressed in citations
received.
The coefficient estimate for the interaction effect
is negative, as expected, and statistically significant.
However, further analysis revealed that the result in
model (3) is dependent on the presence of two
specific sets of data points: the chemical and
pharmaceutical industries in Ireland, both of which
have received unusually large levels of inward
foreign direct investment for production for export.
Dropping these two industries for Ireland resulted
in insignificant coefficient estimates, as model (4)
indicates. No other countries or industries showed
similar impact. The problem persisted when using
OLS with clustered standard errors, either by
industry or country, or when changing the lag to
2 or 3 years, as well as when using the alternative
measures of radicality discussed in the main text.
We conclude that the results of model (3) are
contingent on 18 influential data points represent-
ing said two industries in Ireland and thus not
generally supported.
Model 5 shows the results for the Balassa index as
the dependent variable. The coefficient estimate for
the interaction effect is negative, as expected, and
statistically significant. Unlike in model 3, this
result is not contingent on the presence of Irish
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nesting of the HLM specification. Graphing the
interaction showed that the higher Balassa scores of
CME countries decline with increasing radicality,
whereas the lower Balassa scores of LME countries
increase with radicality. However, the estimates of
Balassa at high levels of radicality have wide confi-
dence intervals, so that we cannot say with confi-
dence that LMEs outperform CMEs at high levels – a
conservative statement would be to say the disad-
vantages of LMEs are diminished. Looking at other
model specifications, the interaction term became
statistically insignificant if OLS with clustered stan-
dard errors by industry or by country was used.
Using originality as a measure of radicality resulted
in a statistically significant result with the wrong
(positive) sign, while the use of generality produced
no statistically significant result. Taking all this
together, we see at best tentative support of H1 in
these results even if the Balassa index represented a
meaningful measure of revealed comparative
advantage, which we doubt.
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N 2772 2772 2772 2754 2772
AIC 3108.5 3110.6 3106.5 2627.6 -2821.2
BIC 3227.0 3241.0 3242.8 2763.8 -2684.9
Log likelihood -1534.2 -1533.3 -1530.2 -1290.8 1433.6
v2 40.98 42.90 49.13 34.53 17.48
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p\0.05, ** p\0.01, ***p\0.001.
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